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Much has been written about the process by which judges reach
decisions in cases governed by the common law, but very little has been
done to test this process empirically. Most empirical efforts have
attempted to determine whether and to what extent judges’ political
views influence their legal decisions. My own interest is different; I
would like to learn more about how judges respond to legal rules, and
particularly to precedent rules established in prior decisions.
Larry Alexander and I have written at some length about the
function of rules in legal decisionmaking.1 Briefly, we argue that, from
the central perspective of someone designing a legal system, it is
desirable that at least some range of legal disputes be governed by
general, determinate rules, and that these rules be treated as
authoritative. To treat a rule as authoritative is to follow it in all cases
that fall within its terms, without further analysis of the underlying
purpose or rationale that motivated the rulemaker to announce the
rule. From a systemic perspective, authoritative rules are attractive for
several reasons. Rules, if they are generally obeyed, can help their
subjects avoid errors and biases that distort case-by-case judgment.
Rules can also provide coordination if all or most subjects treat them
as authoritative. Individuals can act more effectively if they know what
others are likely to do, and an authoritative rule makes it possible to
predict others’ conduct in situations governed by the rule.
Copyright © 2018 Emily Sherwin.
† Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This Article originally
appeared on the Legal Workshop as part of the Duke Law Journal’s 2010 “Symposium on
Evaluating Judging, Judges, and Judicial Institutions.”
1. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES,
AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW (2001).
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At the same time, the generality of rules often leads to
overinclusiveness in application. As a result, rules will sometimes
prescribe outcomes that are wrong, judged by the rules’ own purpose
or rationale. Yet the overinclusiveness of rules does not alter the
conclusion that rules function most effectively when treated as
authoritative. If a rule is well designed—that is, if the rule will prevent
more errors overall than it will cause through overinclusiveness—then
it is best, from the perspective of the system designer, that those who
are subject to the rule follow it in every case to which it applies.2
The difficulty with authoritative rules is that it is not at all clear
how rational subjects can treat rules as authoritative. If a rule appears
to give the wrong answer in a particular case, the rational choice is to
disobey. The subject may understand that rules prevent errors of
judgment, but if the subject also understands that rules are
overinclusive, the subject may nevertheless conclude that his judgment
is correct. The subject may also understand the coordination value of
rules, and yet conclude that the error that will result from following a
rule in a particular case outweighs the loss of coordination that will
result from a single act of disobedience. In each case, the subject may
be wrong, but this does not make it subjectively rational to follow the
rule.3 The consequence is an unbridgeable gap between the perspective
of those who oversee the legal system and the perspective of those
subject to the system’s rules.
Judges occupy two positions in this account of legal rules. First,
they act as rulemakers. Judicial opinions often contain prescriptive
statements that are determinative enough to count as rules and are
intended to serve as decisional standards in future cases. Assuming the
rules are well designed in the sense described above (assuming, that is,
that the rules will prevent more errors than they generate over the long
run), the legal system will benefit if future judges, as well as future
actors, treat them as authoritative: judicial rules, no less than legislative
rules, can reduce errors and provide coordination.
In addition to serving as rulemakers, judges also apply rules to the
cases litigants bring to court. When judges apply rules, their
perspective is similar to that of rule subjects. If a judge is persuaded

2. See id. at 10–21, 55–61. Frederick Schauer reaches a similar conclusion. See FREDERICK
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISION-MAKING IN LIFE AND LAW 128–34 (1991).
3. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 1, at 61–95; HEIDI M. HURD, MORAL COMBAT
62–94 (1999).
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that the governing rule provides the wrong answer (as indicated by the
rule’s underlying rationale) in a particular case, applying the rule will
seem both irrational and unfair. Moreover, the judge may find it
difficult to give due recognition to the long-term advantages of the rule,
because the judge’s attention is focused on the specific facts of the case.
This view of rules and the roles they play in judicial
decisionmaking leads to a number of empirical questions about how
judges respond to rules. The most basic question is whether judges
treat rules as authoritative. Do judges apply rules only when they are
persuaded that the outcome of the rule in the case at hand is consistent
with the rule’s purpose or rationale (or is correct, all things
considered)? If so, the answer to the basic question is no; rules have no
real consequences for adjudication, and the various Legal Realist
speculations about what drives judicial decisionmaking come into play.
Assuming that judges sometimes do follow rules simply because
they are the rules of the system, the next question is how deeply judges
are committed (or how thoroughly they are habituated) to following
rules. Do judges follow rules without reflection only when the purpose
or rationale of the rule has not been brought to their attention? Do
they refuse to consult the rationale or purpose of an established rule if
the terms of the rule apply uncontroversially to the case at hand? Do
they also follow rules in conscious disregard of the rule’s purpose or
rationale, when the rule’s purpose or rationale appears to conflict with
the result it prescribes?
If the answer is that judges who follow rules do treat the rules as
authoritative against their own best judgment about what outcome is
best, subsidiary questions arise about the conditions under which
judges are willing to suspend judgment and follow rules. For example,
the rule in question may be defective, in the sense that it generates
more errors than it prevents overall. Alternatively, the rule may be
sound, in that it prevents more errors than it generates overall, and yet
misfire in a particular case. Here, the question for investigation is
whether differences in the overall quality of the rule affect the level of
judicial obedience to the rule.
Another subsidiary question is whether differences in the
vividness of the facts presented for adjudication affect judges’
responses to precedent rules. Here, the variable is not the quality of
the rule, but the salience or affective impact of a seemingly wrong
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outcome required by the rule.4 The question for investigation is
whether judges approach rules consistently in different factual settings,
or, alternatively, whether their treatment of rules varies according to
the exigencies of particular cases.
These questions are obviously hard to answer. Written opinions
may provide some evidence of judges’ attitudes toward rules, but only
when judges perceive the dilemma of rule-following and also have
reason to discuss it in the course of explaining their decisions. This set
of circumstances may be rare; in any event, opinions that directly
address rule-following are not likely to yield a representative sample
of judicial responses to rules.
A more promising approach might be to conduct controlled
experimental studies on judicial subjects. The logistics of this form of
research are daunting, but work by Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski,
and Andrew Wistrich suggests that it can be done.5 As an illustration,
consider the following stylized example. (Many refinements would be
needed to produce a workable test.) A group of judges is presented
with a problem case. The defendant is a retired veterinarian who has
just moved to a new neighborhood. In his backyard, he keeps a pet
giraffe. The defendant treats the animal well and provides it with ample
space. The giraffe is a quiet animal with no violent tendencies, and it
has no negative sensory effects on neighbors. The defendant kept the
giraffe for several years in another state without incident or complaint.
Neighbors have sued, claiming the giraffe is a nuisance and requesting
an order requiring the defendant to remove it from the neighborhood.
To capture variations in legal rules, some judges might be told that
prior cases establish that keeping a wild animal in a residential
neighborhood is a nuisance per se. This is, presumably, a sound rule—
over the long run, it will tend to prevent harm and offense, though it

4. See generally Norbert Schwartz & Leigh Ann Vaugn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited:
Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 103 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffen &
Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002); Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra, at 397; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky
eds., 1982).
5. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (2007); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001);
Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible
Evidence? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
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may sometimes result in the elimination of unobjectionable pets, such
as the defendant’s giraffe. Other judges might be told that prior cases
establish that keeping a large animal in a residential neighborhood is a
nuisance per se. This rule looks too broad: it may do more harm than
good over the range of cases to which it applies. Judicial subjects would
be asked to decide the case and possibly to comment on the outcome.
A significant number of decisions in the plaintiffs’ favor might suggest
that rules influenced the judges’ decisions, particularly if the judges
signified discomfort with the outcome of the case. If results were
roughly the same for both versions of the problem, the inclination to
follow rules would seem impervious to the quality of the rule. If,
however, outcomes varied according to the version of the precedent
rule presented to judges, this would suggest that judges deciding
whether to follow rules are likely to discriminate according to the
quality of the precedent rule.
The facts of the experimental problem could also be varied to
detect the influence of vivid facts. For example, some judges might not
be given any personal information about the defendant; others might
be told that the defendant rescued the giraffe from sordid conditions
in a private zoo. In this case, variation in decisions would indicate that
judges deciding whether to follow rules discriminate according to the
salience of the factual consequences of applying the rule.
A second set of questions relates to the role of judges as
rulemakers. Frederick Schauer has suggested, very plausibly, that the
quality of judicial rules may suffer as a result of the adjudicatory
context in which judges work.6 In particular, a judge focused on the
salient features of a litigated case may adopt a rule that responds to
those features, without adequately considering the effects of the rule
in other cases that fall within its terms. The judge may assume, in other
words, that the present case is more typical than it is—more
representative, as a cognitive psychologist might say—of cases
governed by the rule. A tame and odorless giraffe, for example, might
not typify wild animals kept as pets. If so, the rule is likely to prove
unsatisfactory over time.
The initial question is whether Professor Schauer’s suggestion—
that judicial rules may be adversely affected by the adjudicatory setting

6. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006)
(“If in fact concrete cases are more often distorting than illuminating, then the very presence of
such cases may produce inferior law whenever the concrete case is nonrepresentative of the full
array of events that the ensuing rule or principle will encompass.”).
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from which they emerge—is correct. If so, a further question is whether
certain features of the judicial process can help avoid or decrease the
distorting effects of vivid facts. For example, are judges less likely to
err in their choice of rules when the parties present them with an array
of purportedly analogous cases that might arise under a proposed
rule?7
It is surely possible to find examples of this pattern in decided
cases, but decided cases are unlikely to provide a systematic overview
of the problem. Again, the most promising alternative is probably
experimental. Judges might be given the facts of a case together with a
selection of proposed decisional rules, the overall quality of which
varies inversely with the attractiveness of their outcomes in the case at
hand.
Empirical information about judicial responses to rules would be
of great utility in studying the judicial process. Obtaining reliable
information would, of course, require tremendous empirical ingenuity:
designing effective problems is a challenge. Eliciting a serious but
candid response from judges is an even greater challenge: judges must
somehow be enticed to do what they ordinarily do, without too much
reflection on the nature of the exercise. Fortunately, the objective of
this short Essay is only to identify the types of information that would
be most helpful to theorists interested in decisionmaking in a regime of
legal rules.

7. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 118–
20 (2008) (suggesting that the method of analogy may serve to counteract bias in rulemaking,
even if it does not survive scrutiny as a method of reasoning).

